If I can show that a given position is self-contradictory then (modulo that the paraconsistent folk may well object) I have proven the position false.
In terms of positive proof for a position, then it does not seem that there is anything available quite equivalent to mathematical proof in either rigour or epistemic certainty. However, that need mark no failing of philosophy. Rather, the message might well be that different standards are appropriate to different disciplines and enterprises. (What historian ever proves anything in a fashion "equivalent to mathematical proof"?)
John Stuart Mill discusses this point in Utilitarianism in what I think is a helpful way:
[B]ut what proof is it possible to give
that pleasure is good? If, then, it is asserted that there is a
comprehensive formula, including all things which are in themselves
good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as an end, but as a
mean, the formula may be accepted or rejected, but is not a subject of
what is commonly understood by proof. We are not, however, to infer that
its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary
choice. There is a larger meaning of the word proof, in which this
question is as amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of
philosophy. The subject is within the cognizance of the rational
faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way
of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of determining the
intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and
this is equivalent to proof.